Art. V. 1. Correspondence relating to the Affairs of Italy. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. 1860.

2. Correspondence relating to the Affairs of Italy, Savoy, and Switzerland. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. 1860.

3. The Congress and the Cabinet. By the Marquis of Normanby, K. G. London. 1859.

4. Le Pape et le Congres. Paris, 1859.

5.A Century of Despotism in Naples and Sicily. By Susan Homer. Edinburgh, 1860.

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Little did the French Emperor foresee or intend the results that have followed from his armed interference in Italy. Little did he know the direction the waters would take when he determined to unsluice the stagnant lake, and fancied that he could channel out the course in which the waters were to flow. Whatever he may have meant by his watchword of Italy free from the Alps to the Adriatic;' whether it did or did not include, along with the expulsion of the Austrians from Lombardy and Venice, a throne in Italy for his cousin Prince Napoleon, as well as the realization of the 'idea' for which, while solemnly disavowing all thoughts of territorial aggrandisement, France made war, — namely, that Savoy and Nice should be tors from Italy and become incorporated with France, —it is plain that the policy of Napoleon III. has been to a great extent disconcerted and baffled by the course of events. There is, however, another monarch who has known well how to turn them to his own advantage, who has reaped where others have sown, and has himself known right well how to sow, unobserved, and who—aided by ministers whose far-seeing sagacity we acknowledge, however much we may condemn the means they have employed—has from first to last shown that those events have not taken him by surprise, and that he has led rather than followed in their path.

From the time when, without any imaginable cause of war, King Victor Emmanuel engaged the little kingdom of Sardinia by the side of the Western Powers in the struggle against Russia in the Crimea, down to the present moment, when he has added to hia dominions the territory, or parts of the territory, of six independent States, he has steadily worked out one idea, and that has been, the Unity of Italy with the House of Savoy upon the throne. And this, now that success has so far crowned his efforts, he openly avows; for in the manifesto which he addressed from Ancona on the 9th of October last to the people of Southern Italy, he declared, 'I have thus been able to maintain in that part of Italy which is united under my sceptre the idea of a national hegemony, out of which was to arise the harmonious concord of divided provinces united in one nation. Italy was put in possession of my view when it beheld me sending my troops to the Crimea by the side of the soldiers of the two great Western Powers. I desired to obtain for Italy the right of taking part in all transactions of European interest.




There arc two views of the astounding drama that has been acted in Italy; each of which has its advocates, but in neither of which can we wholly acquiesce. The one sees in the dazzling scries of events nothing but the triumph of liberty over oppression; and, on the principle that the end justifies the means, exults with unalloyed delight in the idea of a national regeneration. The other sees in them nothing but the reckless ambition of an unscrupulous sovereign, the triumph of insurrection, and the daring contempt of international law. In this country, as might be expected, the first or the Italian view is, beyond all doubt or question, the popular one. It has been adopted with remarkable unanimity by the press; and while all rejoice in the result, few have cared to find fault with the acts that have been successful. Nor need we be surprised at this: it is natural that Englishmen should sympathize with a struggle for freedom, and rejoice in the prospect of a strong constitutional government in Italy in the place of effete despotism like that of Naples, or ecclesiastical misrule like that of Rome. It is natural that the Protestant feeling of the nation should view without displeasure the humiliation of the Pope, and the diminution, if not the destruction, of his temporal power. And there was something in the character of Garibaldi, and in the nature of his enterprise, which seemed to realize the wonders of romance, and to justify that hero-worship which always has been and always will be one of the darling passions of the multitude. The feeling was that which warmed the head and fired the imagination of Macchiavelli, when he almost prophesied the advent of such a deliverer, and exclaimed, 'I cannot express with what love he would be received in all the provinces which have suffered from these foreign inundations; with what n thirst for vengeance, with what steadfast fidelity, with what affection, with what tears! What gates would close themselves against him? What people would refuse him their obedience? What envy would oppose itself to him? What Italian would deny him homage? A ognuno puzza questo barbaro dominio.*

Italy for the Italians is a captivating cry. It seems to express the sentiment of liberty with the force of a truism; and men forget that its true meaning is the expulsion of the foreigner, that 'barbaro dominio' of which Macchiavelli speaks; and can be no argument to justify insurrection against Italian governments, or the overthrow of Italian dynasties. We do not say that they cannot be justified; but this is a very different thing

*Il Principe, cap. 26.

from admitting the right of one independent State to interfere and foment insurrection in the Dominions of another, of which it intends to reap the fruits and carry off the lion's share of the spoil.

The cry of 'Germany for the Germans' would hardly be allowed as a pretext for the invasion of Saxony or Bavaria by Prussia, although we find it employed as an apology for the attempts that are made to deprive Denmark of her provinces, the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, because they are said by community of origin and sameness of language to belong to the Great Fatherland. Men forgot also, that since the fall of the Roman Empire (if even before it) there never has been a time when Italy could be called a nation, any more than a stack of timber can be called a ship. During the middle ages the little Republics into which it was split up fought like tiger-cats against each other; and for the last three hundred years, with the exception of the period of the French Revolution, when all landmarks were effaced, the circumscription of territories, and the distinction of governments, have been as complete in Italy as in any other part of Europe.

By the Treaty of Villafranca, which was definitively signed at Zurich on the 11th of November, 1859, and to which Sardinia was forced to become a party, Lombardy was under one instrument ceded to France, and, tinder another, by France to Sardinia. Thus a blow was struck at the European settlement of 1815, which France has so long desired to subvert. France, too, in receiving directly from Austria the cession of Lombardy, conceived herself to have acquired, as against Austria, the right to interfere at all times to protect the Sardinian possession of that territory. It was also agreed separately between France and Austria that they would make every effort to encourage a Confederation amongst the Italian States, to be placed under the honorary presidency of the Pope. And the rights of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the Duke of Modena, and the Duke of Parma were reserved, on the alleged ground that the territorial delimitation of the independent States of Italy which took no part in the war could be changed only by the Powers who presided at their formation and recognized their existence. It was then proposed by France and Austria that a Congress should assemble to take into consideration the pacification of Central Italy; but it never met. It was found impracticable to get the Great Powers to agree on a common basis of action. Austria insisted on the restoration of the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena. France could not oppose herself to this; and we have no reason to doubt that the French Emperor,




in all sincerity and good faith, made every effort to give effect to the stipulation in favour of the dethroned princes. But England steadily and firmly adhered to the principle that the inhabitants of Tuscany and the Emilia* were to be loft entirely to themselves, to choose their own form of government, and settle, as they thought fit, the question whether they would annex themselves to Piedmont, or form an independent State.

So early as the month of August, 1859, the Tuscan assembly at Florence had voted unanimously, or we believe with only three exceptions, in favour of annexation to Piedmont; and in September following, the revolted province of the Romagna, having convoked a general assembly of representatives at Bologna, declared that 'the people of Romagna refuse to live any longer under the temporal sway of the Pontiff.' With regard to the Romagna and the Legations, which had made common cause in throwing off the allegiance of the Pope, and may be considered as one province, the French Emperor was under no engagement to Austria, and before the end of the year he had satisfied himself that it was vain to dream of coercing; them; he therefore strove to induce tlie Holy See to make a virtue of necessity, and on the 31st of December wrote that remarkable letter to the Pope, in which he said, —

'After a serious examination of the difficulties and the dangers which the different combinations presenter!—I say it with sincere regret, ami however painful the solution may be—what seem* to me most in accordance with the true interests of the Holy See would be to make a sacrifice of the revolted provinces. If the Holy Father, for the repose of Europe, were to renounce those provinces which for the last fifty years have caused so much embarrassment to his government, and were in exchange to demand from the powers that they should guarantee him possession of the remainder, I do not doubt of the immediate restoration or order. Then the Holy Father would assure to grateful Italy peace during long years, and to the Holy See the peaceful possession of the States of the Church.'

In the mean time Central Italy remained without a Government, except such as it had extemporised for itself; and it is only fair and just to say that the conduct of the people during the trying period of hope deferred was admirable. With one melancholy exception,

*The AEmilia or Emilia is the name given to the triangular tract of country, between the Po and the Apennines, which embraces the Duchies of Parma, Modena, and the Romagna. It derives its name from the Via Emilia, which ran frnm Piacenza beyond the northern extremity of the Appennine range as far as Rimini, where it joined the Via Flaminia,

the murder of Colonel Aviti at Parma, accounted for by local and peculiar causes, yet affording a terrible proof of what might have been on a more frightful scale—there was (thanks to the wise guidance of such men as Ricasoli and Farini) neither disturbance nor disorder; and the people seemed determined to prove their fitness for self-government by the calmness of their attitude, the prudence of their counsels, and the moderation of their demands.

Not a whisper was heard of a Republic, or, if heard, it was instantly suppressed by the good sense of an overwhelming majority; and we think that Lord John Russell did not overstate the case when, writing to our Minister at Vienna, he declared:—'At the present time the people of Italy, in harmony with public opinion throughout Europe, seek for order as well as liberty beneath the dome of monarchy, supported by national consent and equal laws. 'And yet their patience was sorely tried. When the vote for annexation to Piedmont, in August, was communicated to King Victor Emmanuel, and he was offered the homage of Tuscany and Emilia, the fear of France compelled him to give an evasive reply; and when, as a provisional expedient, they wished to confer the Regency upon the King's cousin, Prince de Carignan, he did not dare to accept it; but the Chevalier Buoncompagni was nominated in his stead. Sardinia, held in check by France and Austria, hesitated to take possession of a territory the throne of which was vacant, and which held out its arms to receive her; for, as Lord John Russell stated in March last year, in the House of Commons, 'The Austrian Government declared that, if a Sardinian soldier should go into Central Italy, they would at once march their troops to oppose them. On the other hand, the Emperor of France declared lo the Austrian Ambassador at Paris, that the moment a single Austrian soldier crossed the Po the French army would be marched to oppose them.' Lord John Russell also said, in the same speech, that' it was agreed by France, in communication with Austria, that the Congress should be indefinitely postponed;' and it was generally believed that the chief cause of this postponement was the appearance of the pamphlet' Le Pape et le Congres, ' bearing the name of M. de la Guerronniere, but attributed to the French Emperor, which advocated the restriction of the temporal government of the Pope to Rome alone.*

*A pamphlet published in Paris, under the title of Le Pape el le Conyrit, which has created too much stir in the political world not to have attracted your Lordship's attention, is the indirect cause of the postponement. The Austrian Government, it appears,




However this may be, England now came forward with four proposals for settling the difficulty, which wore communicated by Lord John Russell to Karl Cowley, our Ambassador at Paris, in a despatch dated the 15th of January: —

1. That France and Austria should agree not to interfere tor the fiuture by force in the internal affairs of Italy, unless called upon to do so by the unanimous assent of the five Great Powers of Europe.

2. That in pursuance of this agreement the Emperor of the French should concert with his holiness the Pope as to the evacuation of Rome by the troops of France.

3. The internal government of Venetia not to lie in any way matter of negotiation between the European Powers.

4.Great Britain and France to invite the King of Sardinia to agree not to send troops into Central Italy until its several States and Provinces shall, by a new vote of their Assemblies, after a new election, have solemnly declared their wishes as to their future destiny.'

The French Government at once professed its willingness to accept the first three of these propositions, observing, with respect to the second, that the ' evacuation of Rome must remain subordinate to the certainty that no serious danger should result there from to the safety of the Holy See. ' As regarded the fourth, M. Thouvenel, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, slated that the Emperor 'personally considered the principle laid down by Her Majesty's Government, that the future destinies of the States of Central Italy should be ascertained through the Assemblies, to be equitable and practical. But before taking any steps in conjunction with her Majesty's Government in the sense desired by them, His Majesty considered himself to be bound in honour to address himself to the Cabinet of Vienna, to expose what had taken plate since the Peace of Villafranca, and to state the reasons which led him to the conclusion that no other solution was possible than that suggested by Her Majesty's Government.'

The Austrian Government, however, would not accede to the English views, and France then proposed the following plan:—

'1. Complete annexation of the Duchies of Parma and Modena to Sardinia. 2. Temporal

requires an engagement, on the part of the French government, neither to bring before the Congres themselves the measures of which the pamphlet is the advocate, nor to support them if brought forward by others. The French Government hesitate at entering into any such engagement, and Austria in consequence declines appearing at the Congress. —Earl Cowley to Lord John Russell, Jan 1, 1860. Correspondence respecting the Affaire of Italy, 1860.

administration of the Legations of the Romagna, of Ferrara, and of Bologna, under the form of a vicariat, exercised by his Sardinian Majesty, in the name of the Holy See. 3. Re-establishment of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany in its political and territorial independence.'

But this did not meet the approval of either Austria or Sardinia. And we do not believe that any ministry could have stood in Sardinia which continued to oppose itself to the demand for annexation, supported by the unanimous vote of the revolted provinces. The result was that the French Government, in face of the ' inexorable logic of facts, ' no longer insisted on maintaining the separate existence of Tuscany as an independent state, but sullenly withdrew, and left Central Italy to determine its own fate.

The question of annexation to Piedmont, or the erection of a separate kingdom, was put to the vote in Tuscany and the Emilia, and determined by an immense majority in favour of annexation. Baron Ricasoli, who had succeeded Chevalier Buoncompagni as provisional Governor of Tuscany, presented the result of this appeal to universal suffrage to the King on the 22nd of March; and soon afterwards a bill was brought into the Sardinian Chambers to authorise the annexation, and passed into a law.

In the mean time Europe was startled by the announcement that France required a 1 rectification' of her frontiers on the side of the Alps. In other words, the French Emperor insisted upon the cession of territory which he had bargained for as the price of assisting Sardinia in her contest with Austria, and obtaining for her a large accession of dominion. The transaction was discreditable to all the parties concerned, and it involved both Governments in duplicity and dissimulation, if not positive falsehood. We can understand the reason why the bargain was concealed, for it was of vital consequence to Napoleon III. at the outbreak of the war that the Great Powers of Europe should have no hint of H scheme which revived awkward recollections of the policy of the First Empire, and, more than anything else, was likely to rally them on the side of Austria, But we do not understand how statesmen of character could bring themselves to deny peremptorily the existence of a scheme which they knew had at one time been arranged, in the hope that a change of circumstances might prevent it from being carried into effect, and so they might escape the odium of ever being known to have entertained it.

We believe the following to be a true account of the facts of the case, although our limits will not allow us to do more than give the most rapid summary of them.




When the question of the intervention of! France in Italy was originally discussed between the French and Sardinian Governments; or rather, if we are rightly informed, between the Emperor and Count Cavour at a confidential interview, it was agreed or 'understood,' that if the result of the war should be to free Lombardy and Venetia from the grasp of Austria, and annex them to Piedmont, France was to receive Savoy and Nice, or at all events Savoy, as the consideration for her services. At that time there was no idea on the part of the contacting parties that Tuscany and the Emilia i would demand to be incorporated with Sardinia. It was, as the lawyers say, a casus omissus, and unprovided for in the agreement. But the event falsified the expectation. Austria retained Venetia, and Central Italy resolved to join Piedmont. The French Emperor now claimed the fulfilment of the contract, but Sardinia demurred. She took her stand on the letter of the bond: Savoy and Nice were to be the equivalent of Lombardy and Venetia; but Venetia still remained in the hands of Austria, and her chains were riveted by the Peace of Villafranca. The terms of the bargain therefore, not having been kept by France, were not binding upon Sardinia. The French Emperor seems to have admitted the force of this reasoning, or at all events he yielded to it, and did not insist upon his demand; and thus it was that Count Walewski, on the 8th of July, 1859, declared to Earl Cowley, the British Ambassador at Paris, that, ' if at any time the idea of annexing Savoy to France had been entertained, it had been entirely abandoned. ' But when it became apparent that the whole of the Emilian provinces, and in all probability Tuscany also, would become united to Piedmont, he revived the dormant claim, on the ground that the meaning of the agreement was, that, if Sardinia obtained by the aid of French arms a substantial increase of territory on one side of the Alps, she was to make a cession to France on the other.* And to this he conceived himself entitled, even if Tuscany were excluded from the annexation.!

The Sardinian Government, however, conscious of the extreme unpopularity it would incur by giving up provinces one of which was the most ancient inheritance—nay, the very cradle of the House of Savoy, and too glad to find a pretext for escaping from the fulfilment of the odious bargain, resisted the claim.

* See Lord Cowley's speech. in the House of Lords, April 28, 1860.

+M. Thouvenel to Baron de Talleyrand, Feb. 24, 1860. Correspondence on Affairs of Italy.

And now the machinery was put in motion whereby the compulsion of authority is made to assume the appearance of a voluntary act, and a fictitious majority obtained by dexterous intrigue is called the national will, expressed under the imposing name of universal suffrage.

We will not waste words upon the impudence of the attempt to make it appear that the agitation of the question of annexation to France in Savoy and Nice was a spontaneous movement; but soon afterwards the question became the topic of universal discussion, and Europe, although indignant at being duped, laughed at the idea of danger to France because Piedmont was likely to double her territory and population. At this juncture the inhabitants of Chambery adopted at a public meeting an address to King Victor Emmanuel, declaring their wish to remain under the dominion of the House of Savoy, and the Governor of that province stated that, having asked instructions from Turin, he had received the following reply:—

'The policy of the Government of his Ministry is known; it has not varied. The Government never entertained the idea (if ceding Satoy to France, Questioned already previously by the party who dared to moot the separation, the Government did not even think it necessary to reply.'

We never heard that the statement of the Governor was disavowed by Count Cavour, and yet it seems distinctly at variance with the facts. On the 4th of February M. Thouvenel informed Lord Cowley, in Paris, that ' it was true that, among the possible arrangements discussed between the two Governments when they found themselves likely to be engaged side by side in war with Austria, was the cession to France, under certain contingencies, of Savoy and the county of Nice.'* And in a speech made by Count de Persigny in the Council General of the Department of the Loire, at the end of August, when he was the Ambassador of France at our Court, he. said:—' Even before the beginning of the war we had warned Sardinia that if events should bring about a great kingdom in Italy, we should demand that the slopes of the Alps should not remain in its hands. ' Does any one believe that Count Cavour refused to listen to the ' possible arrangement, ' or that he gave any hint to France that his Government would resist the ' demand?' It is indued pitiable to see the way in which the Sardinian Government affected to make Europe believe that they yielded at last to the

*Earl Cowley to Lord J. Unsstl!, Feb. 5, 1860. Correspondence on proposed annexation of Savoy and Nice, 1860.




popular will, and that in ceding Nice and Savoy they merely paid homage to the new principle of universal suffrage invoked to determine the allegiance of subjects. They might have said ' We bow to a supreme necessity, ' and the reason would at least have been understood. But what are we to think of the sincerity of the minister who could write as Count Cavour wrote to M. Thouvenel on the 2nd of March?—

' We feel too deeply what Italy owes to the Emperor not to pay the most serious attention to a demand based on the principle of respect for the wishes of the inhabitants. His Majesty's Government would never consent, with even the greatest prospective advantages, to cede or exchange any one of the parts of the territory which has formel for so many ages the glorious inheritance of the house of Savoy. But the King's Government cannot refuse taking into consideration the changes which parsing events in Italy may have introduced into the situation of the inhabitants of Savoy and Nice. At the moment when we are loudly demanding for the inhabitants of Central Italy the right of disposing of their destiny, we cannot, without incurring the charge of inconsistency and injustice, refuse to the King's subjects dwelling on the other side of the Alps the right, of freely manifesting their will. However poignant the regret we should feel, if the provinces, once the glorious cradle of the monarchy, could decide on demanding their separation from the rest of the King's dominions in order to join other destinies, we should not refuse to acknowledge the validity of this manifestation declared legally and conformably with the prescriptions of Parliament.'

The farce accordingly was played out, the ballot-box was opened, and, by the conjuring process of universal suffrage under the provident care of French emissaries and electioneering agents, the two provinces transferred themselves from Sardinia to France, and another blow was struck at the settlement of 1815.

At the end of March then, last year, the stale of things in Italy was this:—Piedmont, Tuscany, Modena, Parma, the Romagna, and the Legations formed one independent kingdom under the constitutional monarchy of the House of Savoy. Venetia belonged to Austria, as has been her lot since the Treaty of Campo Formic, in 1797; and the rest of Italy, divided between the States of the Church and the Two Sicilies, retained its old governments without modification or change. The position of Sardinia was excellent. She had added to her dominions some of the finest provinces of Italy, rich in material wealth, and filled with an intelligent, docile, and industrious population. It was her obvious policy now to consolidate her new acquisitions, and to set an example

of good government to the rest of Italy, to husband her resources, and to prepare herself for a struggle which might be forced upon her, but which she ought not to seek or precipitate.

Above all, it was her duty to abide loyally by the terms of the Treaty of Peace to which she was a party, and not to cause fresh complexities by ambitious projects or restless intrigues. We find Count Rechberg in January last complaining that 'no tranquillity or repose could exist, nor could the security of peace be assured, so long as the Sardinian Government continued to foment discord and insurrection within the States of her neighbour. '* This was with reference to alleged attempts on the part of Sardinia to incite the populations of Venetia and Southern Tyrol to throw off their allegiance to Austria.! And soon afterwards M. Thouvenel informed Lord Cowley 'that prince Metternich had been ordered to call the attention of the French Government to the proceedings of Sardinian agents in Venetia. A despatch containing a series of facts, which, if true, were very regrettable, had been communicated to him by the Austrian Ambassador.'

With respect to Austria, we arc bound to say that, having accepted the principle of non-intervention, she has adhered to it. Under the most irritating provocation, she has remained purely on the defensive, and neither directly nor indirectly since the peace of Villafranca has interfered in the affairs of Italy beyond the limits of her own frontier. When the Marches and Umbria were invaded by Piedmontese troops, she did not send a soldier to the assistance of the Pope, although as a great Catholic power, she must have felt it almost a duty of religion to protect the Holy See from what she believed to be an act of sacrilegious spoliation. When the King of Naples appealed to her for help, she declined to interfere.

We are not called upon to scrutinize the motives which have restrained her, nor to decide how far she may have been held in check by the fear of France or the exhaustion of her treasury. We accept the fact, and we think that in all fairness and justice Sardinia

*See the letter from Lord A. Loftng to Lord J. Russell,. Ian. 12, 1860, in the Further Correspondence relating to the Affairs of Italy.

+ It is, however, right to quote the following:— 'A deputation from the [Southern?J Tyrol waited upon Count Cavour a few days ago in order to urge that minister 10 listen to their complaints, and to explain the view which they take of the position of affairs in their country. Count Cavour declined to ent-r into any discussion with them upon those points. ' Sir J. Hudson to Lord J. Russell, Feb. 3. 18(50. Further Correspondence on Affairs of Italy.

+ Earl Cowley to Lord John Russell, Jan. 80, 1860. Ibid.




ought to accept it also. That her rule in Venetia has during the last year been harsh and stern, we are not inclined to doubt. The whole province was turned into a camp, martial law was proclaimed, and an overwhelming force was ready to crush the slightest symptom of popular disaffection. But this was the cruel necessity of her position if she was to hold Venetia at all. The time had gone by when she could hope to conciliate the inhabitants of that province by any concessions short of its absolute surrender. They scorned, as a mockery, administrative reform, when their whole hearts were bent on revotion. A bold defiance was hurled against Austria by the Italians, who swore that Venetia should be free; and she could only respond to that defiance by arming her fortresses and strengthening her battalions. She must govern by the sword, or cease to govern altogether. In short, that unhappy state of things existed which Burke described when he said 'Kings will be tyrants from policy, when subjects are rebels on principle.'

Such was—such, alas! is—the state of Venetia. In the Papal States, and especially the Marches, which are separated from Romagna by only an impalpable line, it was with the utmost difficulty that insurrection was kept down. A rising took place in Perugia, on the western slope of the Apennines, in June, 1859. Victor Emmanuel was proclaimed, and a Provisional Government formed. But the town, was attacked by 2000 troops, and Colonel Schmidt, their commander, made himself infamous bv the cruel massacre of many of the inhabitants after the gates had been thrown open, and all resistance was at an end. When Romagna threw off the Papal yoke, the excitement in the Marches became so great that it seemed impossible to prevent a revolutionary outbreak, especially as Garibaldi was on the frontier organizing levies, and ready at a moment's notice to pass the imaginary line, invade the province, and raise the standard of revolt: even the Papal troops were beginning to desert and cross over to Romagna. We believe that at this period the efforts of the Sardinian Government were sincere, at all events they were successful in stopping the further progress of insurrection in this part of the Papal States. Garibaldi was forced or persuaded by Farini to retire, and for the moment aggression was prevented.

Let us now turn to the Two Sicilies, where the smouldering fire of discontent was about to burst into a flame.

Never had a dynasty more emphatic warnings that it was pursuing a policy of self-destruction than the dynasty of the infatuated Bourbons at Naples. We speak not

now of the warnings conveyed by attempts it insurrection, and by the necessity of stifling in dungeons, and crushing by brute force, the voices of many of the best and noblcst of their subjects to prevent the cry against their tyranny from being heard. But we refer to the remonstrances from time to time addressed to them by foreign Powers, who were shocked by the scandal of such a Government. Shortly after the revolution of July, which took place three months before the accession of Ferdinand II. to the throne, Louis Philippe wrote to him a letter, lie said, —

'We are in a period of transition, when often a little must be relinquished so that all may not be lost, and it would give me real joy to learn that your Majesty has given up a system of compression and of severity which caused many days of intense agony to your late august father, and which often banished the smile from the lips of the enlightened King Ferdinand I. Let your Majesty imitate the system in France; you will be a gainer in every respect; for, by sacrificing a little authority, you will insure peace to your kingdom, and stability to your house. The symptoms of agitation are so strongly pronounced and numerous in Italy, that an outbreak may be expected sooner or Inter, accordingly as the stern measures of Prince Metternich may hasten It oradjourn it. Your Mnjesty will he drawn into the current if you are not prepared to stem the tide, and your house will lie burst in two either by the revolutionary stream, or by the measures of repression the Vienna Cabinet may think tit to adopt.'

To this letter the King of Naples sent the following reply, which it is difficult to believe could emanate from anything short of insanity:—

'To imitate France, if ever France can be imitated, I should have to precipitate myself into that policy of Jacobinism for which my people has proved feloniously guilty more than once against the house of its Kings. Liberty is fatal to the House of Bourbon; and as regards myself. I am resolved to avoid, at all price, the fate of Louis XVI. and of Charles X. My people obey force and bend their necks, but woe's me should they ever raise them under the impulse of those dreams which sound To fine in the sermons of philosophers, and which are impossible in practice. With God's blessing, I will give prosperity to my people, and a Government aź honest as they have a right to; but I will be King, and always.

'My people do not want to think; I take upon myself the care of their welfare and their dignity. I have inherited many old grudges, many mad desires, arising from all the faults and weaknesses of the past; I must set this to rights, and I can only do so by drawing closer to Austria without subjecting myself to her will. We are not of this century. The Bourbons are ancient, and if they were to try to shape themselves according to the pattern of the new dynasties, they would be ridiculous.




We will imitate the Hapsburgs. If fortune plays us false, we shall at least be true to ourselves.

' Nevertheless your Majesty may rely upon my lively sympathy and my warmest wishes that you may succeed in mastering that ungovernable people who make France the curse of Europe.


The course of misrule which Ferdinand pursued is strikingly narrated by Miss Horner.* It became so bad that in October, 1856, both the English and French Governments took the strong and unusual step of recalling their ambassadors, and breaking off diplomatic relations with the Court of Naples, on the avowed ground of its vindictive and arbitrary conduct, and the cruel inhumanity with which it treated its political prisoners. Ferdinand II died in May, 1859, and was succeeded by his son, Francis II. The two Western Powers resumed diplomatic intercourse with Naples in hopes that the Government would be carried on in a different and wiser spirit. But it soon became evident that change in the occupant of the throne had made no change in the policy of the Government, and the maxim of the young King seemed to be that, if his father had chastised his subjects with whips, he would chastise them with scorpions. Again the voice of warning and remonstrance was heard. In July, 1859, Lord John Russell wrote to Mr. Elliot, the British Minister at Naples, and said:—

'It may suit the purposes of those who have thriven on the past abuses to encourage the King to follow in his father's footsteps, or a change of system would probably lead to their ruin; but it appears to her Majesty's Government that the King has now to choose between the ruin of his evil counsellors and his own: if he supports and upholds them, and places himself under their guidance, it requires not much foresight to predict that the Bourbon dynasty will cease to reign at Naples, by whatever combination, Regal or Republican, it may be replaced.' And he added that, 'neither the moral nor the material support of England is to be looked for by the King, if, by a continual denial of justice, and the refusal of an improved form of internal administration, the Neapolitan people should be driven into insurrection, and should succeed in expelling the present dynasty from the throne.'

In January last year he informed Mr. Elliot that the British Government could

* A. Century of Despotism in Naples and Sicily. 'The materials of this well-written little hook are derived from the larger work, Colletta's 'History of Naples,' which Miss Homer bus recently translated and brought down to the present time.

only lament the blindness of the Neapolitan Council, and would 'neither accept any part of their responsibility, nor undertake to ward off the consequences of a misgovernment which has scarcely a parallel in Europe.' And finally, in March, Mr. Elliot told M. Carafa, the Neapolitan Minister for Foreign Affairs, that he 'felt that the destruction of his Majesty and of the dynasty is inevitable unless wiser counsels are listened to.' When, therefore, not long afterwards, the King, panic-stricken at the rapid progress of insurrection, applied to the Foreign Powers to guarantee to him the possession of his throne, there was no one. in this country who did not rejoice to hear that they had refused.

The danger of the King's position was so apparent that even his uncle interposed. In a remarkable letter written to Francis II on the 3rd of April last year, the Count of Syracuse pointed out what he called the 'blindness and madness' of refusing to acknowledge the principle of Italian nationality, which for centuries had remained in the field of ideas, but had now descended vigorously into the field of action, and he advised the King to shake off the influence of Austria, and identify himself with the policy of Sardinia.

But it was then too late, even if the ears of the Monarch and his advisers had not been deaf to such advice. At the very moment when the Count of Syracuse was counselling a change of policy to avert insurrection, the revolution had begun. Early in April the island of Sicily rose in revolt. It seems to have begun at Palermo, where, on the 4th of April, the Royal troops were attacked, and the town was placed in a state of siege. But it soon spread like lightning over the island. Messina, Catania, and Agrigentum declared for the insurgents; a secret committee organized their movements, and guerilla bands multiplied so fast that in a short time it was computed that there were not less than 200, 000 Sicilians in arms. For a month the insurrection raged in the island without any direct help from Italy. But it produced there a profound sensation, and there was one man who determined that, come what might, he would raise a body of volunteers, and take part in the struggle on the side of liberty. This was Garibaldi, who had already, as wo have seen, been with difficulty restrained from invading the Marches and provoking a conflict with the forces of the Pope. He now actively employed himself in organizing an expedition to Sicily, and embarked at Genoa on the night of the 5th of May with upwards of 2000 volunteers. An enthusiastic crowd was assembled to witness their departure, and the only semblance of concealment of their purpose was that they did not march in their uniforms,




which had previously been put on board three steamers which were lying outside the harbour. The volunteers were conveyed to them from different points along the shore. Before he reached the shores of Sicily Garibaldi prepared a proclamation, in which he called the Italians to arms in the name of 'Italy and Victor Emmanuel.'

Garibaldi landed in Sicily, at Marsala, on the 11th of May, and on the 14th, as 'Commander-in-Chief of the National Force in Sicily,' assumed the Dictatorship of the island in the name of Victor Emmanuel. Bands of volunteers soon began to pour into the island from Sardinia, and it was in vain for the Government to deny (as it did for some time deny) that this was done with its connivance and consent. Every one knew that its professions were belied by its acts, for the undisguised manner in which recruiting went on 'in Piedmont, Lombard', and Tuscany, and the collection of vessels at Genoa, of which the destination was Sicily, made ignorance of the object an impossible excuse.

But, indeed, afterwards, when the success of the enterprise was assured, and Sardinia was about to reap the fruits of Garibaldi's exploit, she took credit to herself for the underhand assistance she had given. In his address from Ancona to the people of Southern Italy on the 9th of October, Victor Emmanuel made it a matter of boast, and declared—

'It was qnite natural that the events which had taken place in Central Italy should have more or less excited the minds of the people of South Italy. In Sicily this disposition of the people found vent in open revolt. The people were fighting for liberty in Sicily, when a brave warrior, devoted to Italy and to me—General Garibaldi—sprang to their assistance. They were Italians; I conld not, I ought not to restrain them.'

And what was the conduct of England? If ever there was a time when it behoved the English Government to keep itself clear from all suspicion of complicity in insurrection, it was now. Independently of the rules of international law and the plain obligation of one State not to interfere in the internal struggles of another, the Government had preached to Austria and France the doctrine of non-intervention as the one sole principle to be observed by the Great Powers in the question of Italy. It was the attitude and moral influence of England which more than anything else prevented Austria from lending assistance to the Pope. On the one hand, her duty as a Sovereign Power commanded her to respect the obligations of treaties,

and to observe the strictest good faith; on the other, her sympathies with liberty forbade her to support Governments, whose misrule she detested, in a contest with subjects driven by oppression into revolt. We shall see by and bye that, in the opinion of Lord John Russell, this doctrine of non-intervention did not apply to Garibaldi or Victor Emmanuel, and that Garibaldi was justified in interfering because he was an Italian patriot, and Victor Emmanuel because ho was an Italian king. But letting this pass, it excluded all who were beyond the limits of that which was once called a 'geographical expression'—Italy. If, however, the unchecked supply of money and men from England, with the knowledge of the Government that they were to be employed in aid of the Sicilian insurgents, constitutes complicity, we do not see how the charge can be denied. Advertisements appeared openly in the newspapers soliciting subscriptions for Garibaldi in his enterprise—the word was afterwards, indeed, softened down to 'testimonial'—and the names of the subscribers were ostentatiously paraded. When the question was asked in the House of Commons in May whether a person so subscribing was liable to be indicted, it was admitted by the principal law-officer of the Crown that, ' according to the common law of England, any subject of the Queen who, either directly or indirectly, may supply money in aid of the revolting subjects of any nation or power with whom we are in alliance, commits an offence at common law;' but at the same time he asserted that there was a long interval between the enunciation of that principle and the manner in which it is to be carried into execution, and that there was no case in which there had been a decision of the general principle in the shape of an indictment for that particular offence. In other words, the Government were not prepared to enforce the law. And this was openly avowed by Lord John Russell in the same debate, in which, of course, he could not take part without dragging in the Revolution of 1688. "We doubt, however, the prudence of the Minister who attempts to be facetious when dealing with such topics as filibustering and rebellion. He said:—

'A movement such as that which Walker attempted in South America, when he sought to invade and to obtain possession of territory, with no higher object in view than his own selfish interests, a one case; but a patriot fighting for the independence of his country is quite another case. We know that one sympathies and the judgement of history will distinguish between the cases of the filibuster and felon, and that of the hero and the patriot. We had once a great filibuster




who landed in England in 1688. He not only received considerable support, but nil the people of England flocked around him. That filibustering was successful. There are cases in which it is not sufficient to say that Garibaldi is a man fighting against a Sovereign whom he ought to respect, or that the Pope is endeavouring to maintain his authority by unlawful expedients It is not enough to say these things in a glib and fluent manner.'

We are not at present concerned with the question whether William of Orange was a filibuster or not; but we cannot admit that Garibaldi was 'a patriot fighting for the independence of his country, ' unless we assume that there was no difference between a subject of Sardinia and a subject of Naples, because both were Italians, and that the Bourbons, who had ruled over the Two Sicilies for upwards of a century, were foreign usurpers. Will Lord John Russell venture to assert that community of language effaces distinction of country, or that, according to the doctrine of natural boundaries, geography is to determine citizenship and allegiance? If so, it will be difficult for him to deal with the pretensions of France when she claims the frontier of the Rhine; and we commend to his attention the following passage from a speech of Lord Palmerston when the question before the House of Commons was not the conduct of Garibaldi in the invasion of Sicily, but the policy of Napoleon in the annexation of Savoy:—

'For, Sir, if you come to natural boundaries, and it' the country which claims them is to be the judge of where they are, it is very easy to sea that Europe would find it very difficult to decide where danger would begin and where resistance upon a grand scale ought to be undertaken. If language were to be the measure of aggrandizement, it is plain that it would be difficult for many countries to show that they had a good title to possessions which they now hold. Therefore, these two principles of natural boundaries and of community of language are principles the establishment of which would be very dangerous to Europe, however small, comparatively speaking, might be the instance in which they were carried into effect.'

But sympathy with Garibaldi soon assumed a more active form. He sent over to England an accredited agent to collect not only money, but men; and a considerable body of volunteers enrolled themselves and embarked for Italy to fight against a government with which their Sovereign was at peace. This was not only in. defiance of international law, bnt in direct contravention of the Foreign Enlistment Act. The British Government were bound to put a stop to such a state of things; but they did nothing. We say that it is a scandal and disgrace,

and a fatal and dangerous precedent, to allow this kind of privateering in the service of insurrection. The Sicilians may have had the holiest of causes; but it was no cause of ours. And we hold that, whether it be to support a throne like that of Spain in 1835, when the Foreign Enlistment Act in this country was suspended by an Order in Council, or to upset a throne like that of Naples in 1860, Englishmen have no right to take up arms in a quarrel in which their Government is not engaged and in which they have no concern. And mark the consequences that may follow from permitting such a course. At the very time when volunteers were enlisting in England for Garibaldi, the emissaries of the Pope were raising recruits in Ireland for the defence of the Holy See: so that it was quite within the bounds of probability that these adventurers might meet in hostile conflict on the same battle-field, and Englishmen and Irishmen cut each other's throats, while the one side shouted 'Victor Emmanuel for ever!' and the other 'Long live the Pope!' Besides, the honour of the English name is carried with the English flag, and it is exposed to all the obloquy which the misfortune or misconduct of those who bear it may bring upon it. *

* Even tourists should beware how they comport themselves when they seek among foreigners a little excitement and temporary importance. The following exploit of Mr. E. James, incredible upon any authority save his own, was communicated by himself to one of the daily journals. (It may be premised that Mr. James had ventured, we do not know in what capacity, but attired in a 'half-military, half navy equipment,' as the artist of the 'Illustrated News' calls it, a little too near the scene of hostilities.)

'The cry arose that the "Cavalry were coming!" and the panic seized the troops. In the mŔlŔe I lost my carriage; my servant had very indiscreetly taken shelter with some priests in the top of a convent, and during his absence the carriage disappeared. I had to walk along the high-road to Caserta; a little Swiss soldier who had been wounded by a rifle-ball in the wrist, and was going to the hospital there, accompanied me. On our way I saw seven or eight soldiers, among whom were two officers—the Swiss soldier told me they belonged to a Sicilian regiment—seated on one of the long agricultural carts, which they had taken from a field adjoining the road, and were proceeding at a rapid pace to Caserta. As they met troops coming from that town to relieve Santa Maria they spread the panic among them; they cried out, " The cavalry are coming!" "The artillery ore close on us I" " We shall all perish!" " Buck to Caserta, back!" More than one regiment wavered and turned. The officers behaved firmly and well, drew their swords, and urged their men on; but the alarm had spread, and the soldiers refused to follow. I followed these mischievous and cowardly fellows to Caserta, asked for the colonel of a regiment who spoke French, gave him my name and address, pointed out the fellows as they entered the square in front of the Palace, and, although I did not request it as a personal favour, I certainly




We have not space nor is it necessary to give details of the marvellous success of Garibaldi—

'Whose nnme in arms through Europe rings, Filling each mouth with envy or with praise,

And nil the jealous monarch with amaze,

And rumours loud that daunt remotest kings.'

In an incredibly short time, and notwithstanding the resistance of the royal troops, which with wanton cruelty bombarded Palermo, lie reduced all the fortified places in Sicily, except the citadel of Messina. He landed at Melito on the 19th of August, and made his entry into Naples on the 8th of September. And how did he enter? Not at the head of victorious legions with all the pomp of war, but, accompanied by a few friends, as a passenger in a railway-carriage! He had conquered by the mere sound of his name, as the walls of Jericho fell down with a shout. The only place where anything like resistance was attempted was Reggio, the fortress which commands the Strait opposite Messina, and which was taken in a few hours. At San Giovanni a body of Neapolitan troops, two thousand strong, surrendered without a blow; and we are told that when Garibaldi went amongst them he was almost torn to pieces 'by hugging and embracing. ' At Monteleone ten thousand more laid down their arms; and, after staying a few days at Salerno, the Dictator of the Two Sicilies, accompanied by his staff, proceeded by the railway-train to the capital.

But what in the mean time had become of the King and the main body of the Neapolitan army? As the insurrection in Sicily went on, and all hope of putting it down by force was at an end, Francis II. endeavoured to avert ruin by concession. lie dared not trust himself in his capital, but from Portici, at the end of June, he issued a decree proclaiming the Constitution of the 10th of February, 1848, a general amnesty of political offences, and the liberty of the press. He also charged Commander Spinelli with the formation of a

suggested that they should be marched out and shot; they were at once taken to the guardhouse, and were no more seen by me. It is only just to say that several regiments passed these dastardly renegades unnoticed, and murched on to the relief of the village.'

That is to say, a mere foreign spectator (for notwithstanding the pistols and ' half-military equipment, 'we cannot suppose that he belonged, even as a volunteer, to the Garihaldian force), being rather out of humour at ' having to walk,' suggested—all but requested—that seven or eight soldiers, who were cording along the road with himself, but were more fortunate in obtaining carriage, should—for conduct witnessed and not animadverted upon by many officers of their own army—be executed without trial!

liberal ministry, which was to frame the articles of a Statute 'on the basis of national and Italian institutions;' and he convoked an assembly of the national Parliament for the 10th of September. The tricolour flag was hoisted at the castle of St. Elmo. Representative institutions were decreed for Sicily, and one of the royal princes was to act as viceroy of the island. But these and other concessions came too late. Many towns revolted, and the army showed that it could not be trusted. The King had also sent ambassadors to Turin to propose a confederacy with Sardinia upon the Italian constitutional principles. But the Sardinian Government rejected these overtures. Abandoned by all, on the morning of the 6th of September he embarked on board a Spanish steamer, and took refuge in the strong fortress of Gaeta, which, with that of Capua, now alone of all his dominions remained in his hands.

Leaving Naples for a moment, let us turn to the Papal States. The Pontifical Government did all in its power at the beginning of last year to recruit its army by foreign mercenaries; and early in April the well-known French General Lamoriciere was appointed to the chief command. We do not expect historical accuracy from a soldier engaged to defend a desperate cause, but it is startling to be told in a military order of the day that 'Revolution, like Islamism in by-gone times, now threatens Europe; and now, as then, the cause of the Papacy is the cause of the civilization and of the liberty of the world.' We pass over the period from April to September, during which the new levies were drilled, and garrisons occupied, and attempts at insurrection sternly put down. For, as may be well supposed, the events that took place in Sicily and Naples shook the States of the Church to their centre, and nothing but the strong hand of military repression prevented the people from rising both in Umbria and the Marches, and throwing off the Papal yoke.

It was at this juncture, and, unless we are mistaken, very soon after some of the principal persons of the Sardinian Court had personally communicated with the French Emperor at his newly-acquired city of Chambery, that Count Cavour addressed to Cardinal Antonelli, the Cardinal Secretary of the Holy See, a letter which, in its bold contempt of the rules of international law, is without a parallel. It is dated Turin, September 7:—

'Eminence—The Government of H. M. the King of Sardinia could not without serious regret see the formation and existence of the bodies of foreign mercenary troops in the pay of the Pontifical Government. The organization of such corps, not consisting, as in all civilized governments, of citizens of the country, but of men of all languages,




nations, and religions, deeply offends the public conscience of Italy and Europe. The want of discipline inherent to such troops, the inconsiderate conduct of their chiefs, the irritating menaces with which they pompously till their proclamations, excite and maintain a highly dangerous ferment. The painful recollection of the massacre and pillage of Perugia is still alive among the inhabitants of the Marches! and Umbria. This state of things, dangerous in itself, became still more so after the facts which have taken place in Sicily and in the kingdom of Naples, the presence of foreign troops, which insults the national feeling, and prevents the manifestation of the wishes of the people, will infallibly cause the extension of the movement to the neighbouring provinces. The intimate connexion which exists between the inhabitants of the Marches and Umbria, and those of the provinces annexed to the States of the King, and reasons of order and security in his own territory, lay His Majesty's Government under the necessity of applying, as far as is in its power, an immediate remedy to such evils. King Victor Emmanuel's conscience does not permit him to remain a passive spectator of the bloody repression with which the arms of the foreign mercenaries would extinguish every manifestation of national feeling in Italian blood. No government has the right of abandoning to the will and pleasures of a horde of soldiers of fortune, the property, the honour, and lives of the inhabitants of a civilized country. For these reasons, after having applied to His Majesty the King, my august Sovereign, for his orders, I have the honour of signifying to your Eminence that the King's troops are charged to prevent, in the name of the rights of humanity, the Pontifical mercenary corps from repressing by violence the expression of the sentiments of the people of the Marches and Umbria. I have, moreover, the honour to invite your Excellency, for the reasons above explained, to give immediate orders for the disbanding and dissolving of those corps, the existence of which is a menace to the peace of Italy. Trusting that your Eminence will immediately communicate to me the measures taken by the Government of his Holiness in the matter, I have the honour of renewing to your Eminence the expression of my high consideration.


In this letter we find an European statesman demanding, in the name of his Government, under the threat of invasion, that an independent I'ower shall dismiss its army on the ground that it is composed of foreign mercenary troops, who are engaged in the repression of the 'manifestations of national feeling,' or, in other words, putting down a wide-spread insurrection. We have no sympathy with the Papal Government; we believe it to be one of the very worst in existence, and we rejoice in the defeat of General Lamoriciere and his polyglot soldiers, collected from all corners of Europe. But we cannot blind ourselves to the fact that the reasoning of Count Cavour is false and dangerous.

It is false, because every State has the undoubted right to take mercenaries into its pay—we believe that there is no nation in Europe which has not, at some time or another, employed them; arid it is dangerous, because it sets a precedent for interference between a government and its subjects which would lead to interminable war. It is impossible to deny the force of Cardinal Antonelli's reply, when he said:—

'The new principles of public law which yon lay down in your letter would be indeed sufficient to dispense me from giving any answer at all, they being so contrary to those which have constantly been acknowledged by all governments and nations... Your Excellency concludes your painful despatch by inviting me, in the name of your Sovereign, to immediately order the disarming and disbanding of the said troops. This invitation was accompanied by a sort of menace on the part of Piedmont, in case of refusal, to prevent the action of the said troops by means of the Royal troops. This involves a quasi injunction which I willingly abstain from qualifying. The Holy See could only repel it with indignation, strong in its legitimate rights, and appealing to the law of nations under the:c.;is of which Europe has hitherto lived'...

Whether the Sardinian minister could or could not have put his interference on better grounds, we shall not now enquire; but we cannot admit that Sardinia alone, of all the European States, is, like 'a chartered libertine, ' to be held free from the obligations of international law, or that she is to be permitted, without a protest, to lay down new principles of which the logical consequence would be, that the right of the strongest is that alone which ought to be recognized in the relations of two independent governments. For if Sardinia may with impunity make demands which are contrary to the received law of nations, and invade the territory of her neighbour unless those demands are complied with, d fortiori France, and Austria, and Russia may do the same. And it would be difficult to justify waging war with Russia in the Crimea because she had crossed the Danube for the purpose of holding Wallachia and Moldavia as a 'material guarantee.' AN e feel the more hound to challenge the dangerous doctrine of Count Cavour, because it has received the high sanction of Lord John Russell, the Foreign Minister of England, in a despatch which has created no little sensation in Europe, and which we trust will not pass without comment when Parliament assembles. To anticipate for a moment our narrative of facts, we must mention that, when the Papal States were invaded by the Piedmontese army under General Fanti and Cialdini in September,




the Emperor of the French (whatever may have been his real sentiments) recalled his Minister from Turin; and when at a later period the same army crossed the Neapolitan frontier, in October, the Emperor of Russia withdrew the Russian Mission, there being no ambassador, from that capital; and the Prince Regent of Prussia expressed his dissatisfaction at the conduct of Sardinia, although he did not go so far as to recall the Prussian Minister. It was after these diplomatic acts that Lord John Russell felt himself called upon, by that impulse which leads him to write letters more celebrated than successful, to read to the Great Powers a lecture on international law, and to establish the principle, which if true is at least novel, that where subjects have ' good reasons' for taking up arms against their governments, it is right in another Stale to render them assistance. In a despatch to Sir James Hudson, the British Minister at Turin, dated October 27, Lord John Russell said,

'The large questions which appear to them to be at issue are these:—Were the people of Italy justified in asking the assistance of the King of Sardinia to relieve them from governments with which they were discontented? and was the King of Sardinia justified in furnishing the assistance of his arms to the people of the Roman and Neapolitan States? There appear to have been two motives which have induced the people of the Roman and Neapolitan States to join willingly in the subversion of their governments. The first of these was, that the Government of the Pope and the King of the Two Sicilies provided so ill for the administration of justice, the protection of personal liberty, and the general welfare of their people, that their subjects looked forward to the overthrow of their rulers as a necessary preliminary to all improvement in their condition.

'The second motive was, that a conviction had spread since the year 1849 that the only manner in which Italians could secure their independence of foreign control was by forming one strong government for the whole of Italy. The struggle of Charles Albert in 1848, and the sympathy -which the present King of Sardinia has shown for the Italian cause, have naturally caused the association of the name of Victor Emmanuel with the single authority under which the Italians aspire to live.

'Looking at the question in this view, Her Majesty's Government must admit that the Italians themselves are the best judges of their own interests.

'That eminent jurist Vattel, when discussing the lawfulness of the assistance given by the United Provinces to the Prince of Orange when he invaded England and overturned the throne of James II., says—"The authority of the Prince of Orange had doubtless an influence on the deliberations of the States-General, but it did not lead them to the commission of an act of injustice, for when a people for good reasons take up arms against an oppressor, it is but an act of justice and generosity to assist brave men in the defence of their liberties."

'Therefore, according to Vattel, the question resolves itself into this—Did the people of Naples and of the Roman States take up arms against their governments for good reasons?

'Upon this grave matter Her Majesty's Government bold that the people in question are themselves the best judges of their own affairs. Her Majesty's Government do not feel justified in declaring that the people of Southern Italy had not good reasons for throwing off their allegiance lo their former governments; Her Majesty's Government cannot, therefore, pretend to blame the King of Sardinia for assisting them.'

We need not quote the rest of the letter, for with it we have no concern. We are not 'partisans of the fallen government,' nor do we assert that the people of the Roman States were attached to the Pope, and the people of the kingdom of Naples to the dynasty of Francis II. But we pray attention to the passage which we have marked in italics. Her Majesty's Government cannot blame Sardinia for assisting a people which has good reasons for throwing off their allegiance. Who is to be the judge of those reasons? Was there ever yet a revolt in which the insurgents did not believe themselves to be in the right? and was there ever a government which did not believe rebels against itself to be in the wrong? Lord John Russell shelters himself behind the authority of Vattel, and, as usual, draws his illustration from his stock precedent—the Revolution of 1688. But in the first place, Vattel is a very poor authority; as Chancellor Kent says of him, 'he is not sufficiently supported by the authority of precedents which constitute the foundation of the positive law of nations.'* And in the next place, Lord John Russell ought to have continued the quotation. Vattel goes on to say, ' Whenever, therefore, a civil war is kindled in a State, foreign Powers may assist that party which appears to them to have justice on its side. ' This no doubt is the logical consequence of his previous proposition; but it proves its falsity. It is, in fact, a licence for intermeddling, which is wholly destructive of national independence. These doctrines, as we shall show a little later, were repudiated by the Sardinian Government, and they are wholly at variance with what has hitherto been the policy of this country in the affairs of Europe. We will cite a memorable example. When, in 1821, revolution broke out in Spain, and the progress of the Liberals at length threatened destruction to the monarchy, the Congress of Verona was assembled in the following year to consider the course to be adopted by the Great Powers.

1 Kent's Commentaries, i. 17.




Lord Londonderry was to have gone as the Plenipotentiary of England, but on his sudden death, the Duke of Wellington was appointed in his stead, and in the instructions drawn up by the deceased statesman and transferred to the Duke, we find the following passage: 'With respect to Spain there seems nothing to add to or vary in the course of policy hitherto pursued. Solicitude for the safety of the royal family, observance of our engagements with Portugal, and a rigid abstinence from any interference in the internal affairs of that country, must be considered as forming the limits of his Majesty's policy.' Mr. Canning, who had succeeded as Foreign Secretary, was equally explicit in his instructions to the Duke, and said, 'I am to instruct your (trace at once frankly and peremptorily to declare that to any such interference, come what may, his Majesty will not be a party.' The Duke of Wellington refused to sign the process verbal of the Conference, because the opinions of the other Powers were therein expressed in favour of intervention; and in a separate note which he addressed to the Plenipotentiaries of the Allies (Nov. 20, 1822) he vindicates the principle on which Great Britain was resolved to act. He said, 'His Majesty's ' Government is of opinion that to animadvert upon the transactions of an independent State, unless such transactions affect the essential interests of his Majesty's subjects, is inconsistent with those principles on which his Majesty has invariably acted on all questions relating to the internal concerns of other countries; that such animadversions, if made, must involve his Majesty in serious responsibility if they should produce any effect, and must irritate if they do not; and if addressed to the Spanish Government, are likely to be injurious to the best interests of Spain, and to produce the worst consequences upon the public discussions between that country and France. The King's Government must therefore decline to advise his Majesty to hold a common language with his allies upon this occasion; and it is so necessary for his Majesty not to be supposed to participate in a measure. of this description, and calculated to produce such consequences, that his Government must equally refrain from advising his Majesty to direct that any communication should be made to the Spanish Government on the subject of its relations with France.'

But, moreover, if it was right in Sardinia te help the oppressed subjects of the Pope, she was entitled to render aid to the oppressed subjects of Austria, and surely it would have been as much an act of 'justice and generosity ' to assist the Italians of Venetia as it was to assist the Italians of the Papal States. Lord John Russell, at all events,

is the last man who could blame her for such an act; and yet, strange to say, less than two short months before his letter of October, Lord John Russell had written another in which he denounced such a scheme, and even went so far as to hint that if it were attempted Great Britain herself might take part in hostilities against Sardinia. We will quote some passages from this despatch, which was addressed to Sir James Hudson, and dated August 31. The last sentence, in which the interests of England in the Adriatic are made the plea wFiy Sardinia should abstain from an ' act of justice and generosity in assisting brave men in the defence of their liberties'— we are quoting the words of Yattel—gives a selfish and most ungracious reason for the policy which the English Minister advises the King of Sardinia to adopt:—

'... Still, although Austria, France, and England have abstained from all interference in Sicily and Naples, there nevertheless exists a fear at Paris and at Vienna that the annexation of the Roman and Neapolitan States may be followed by an attack by the Italian forces upon the Venetian possessions of the Emperor of Austria. It is clear that such an attack could not take place without the assent of the King of Sardinia. It is equally clear that taking a legal view of the question, the King of Sardinia has no excuse for breaking the Treaty of Zurich, recently concluded and signed. The King of Sardinia was free not to accept the preliminaries of Villafranca and the Treaty of Zurich; but, having renounced a continuation of the war, after having given his royal word to live in peace and friendship with Austria, he is no longer free to cast aside his obligations and direct a wanton attack against a neighbouring Prince.

'It is, moreover, evident in the present case, that interests go hand in-hand with the prescriptions of duly. An attack against the Austrian enemy encamped behind powerful fortresses is not an undertaking in which success may be reasonably expected. And if such an attack should fail, it would perhaps offer to Austria the desired opportunity of restoring the Romagna to the Pope, and Tuscany to the Grand Duke.

'There is good reason to believe that neither of these acts would be considered by Franco as irreconcilable with the Treaty of Zurich; yet such acts would certainly be most detrimental to the independence of Italy and to her future tranquillity. The King of Sardinia in gaining Lombardy, Parma, and Modena, but losing Savoy, Nice, and Tuscany, would no longer be able to resist Austria, who would be fighting for a good cause—the preservation of her territory and the redemption of her military honour. The only hope left to Sardinia in such a conflict would be to bring France into the battle-field, and excite an European war. We trust Count Cavour will not give way to such dangerous illusions. The Great Powers are bent upon the maintenance of peace, and Great Britain has interests in the Adriatic over which she keeps a most careful watch.'




We imagine that this advice will not have much effect if the time comes when Victor Emmanuel believes that he can attack Venetia with success, and that Lord John Russell will then find his letter of October quoted against his letter of August. Sardinia seems determined to care as little for the maxims of international law as the Bay of Tunis regarded them on a certain memorable occasion when he rid himself of the French consul.

To return, however, to the order of events. At the beginning of September General Lamoriciere, commanding the Papal army, which was badly provided with artillery and means of transport, and of which only a small portion had rifled muskets, was assured by Cardinal Antonelli that the Piedmontese troops would prevent an invasion of the Marches by others, and would make no attack themselves. The Piedmontese Generals, however, after a notification which cannot be called a warning, entered the Papal States on the 11th of September, in two divisions. Lamoriciere was in want of money and of bread, and, to keep open his communications with Ancona, he attacked the Sardinian General, between Crorctta and CastelFidardo, on the 18th of September. The battle was fierce and bloody, and the Papal troops were utterly defeated. General Lamoriciere himself escaped with difficulty, with a handful of horsemen, to Ancona. Amongst those who fell on this disastrous day was General de Pimodan, a young French officer connected with some of the noblest families in France; who had offered his sword to the Pope to defend what he believed to be the holy cause of religion. Next day 4000 of the Pontifical troops laid down their arms at Loretto. They were allowed the honours of war, and both officers and men were permitted to return to their homes. Indeed, throughout the whole campaign the conduct of the Piedmontese was marked by humanity and forbearance. Spoleto, which was garrisoned by 500 men, 300 of whom were Irish, had surrendered on the 17th, and after the battle of CastelFidardo the Papal army outside the walls of Ancona had ceased to exist. Ancona was immediately invested by land and sea, and on the 29th of September was forced to capitulate.

The result of these successes was that, except within the charmed circle occupied by the French army at Rome, the whole of the population declared for King Victor Emmanuel, and the temporal Government of the Pope was at an end. In fact, that very state of things had come to pass which had, with a kind of prophetic inspiration, been suggested at the beginning of the year by the pamphlet 'Le Pape et le Congres,' to which we have already alluded.

And it is not unreasonable to presume that, however much the French Emperor may have thought it decent to censure openly the conduct of Sardinia in the invasion of the States of the Church, he did not secretly disapprove of a step by which that result was brought about which he had indicated as the best solution of the Papal difficulty.

Rome, and the territory immediately around Rome, were, at all hazards, to be preserved to the Pope. Accordingly, when the plot thickened, and the Sardinian army was pressing onwards, and Umbria and the Marches were proclaiming Victor Emmanuel, fresh French troops were poured into Rome, and General de Goyon, who had been recalled to Paris, was ordered to resume his former command, 'to protect, 'as he announced in his order of the day,' the interests of Catholicism in the person of the Holy Father, who is its most legitimate and most high representative, and to guarantee the safety of the Holy City, which is its seat.'

We need not repeat our emphatic condemnation of the French occupation of Rome. It began in a violent act of injustice towards a people which, copying the example of France, had chosen a Republic as their form of government. We are not informed what pledges Lord Palmerston obtained or sought as to its duration; but it has been continued in direct defiance of the principle of non intervention which France insists that other nations shall observe in the affairs of Italy It is not, however, difficult to assign reasons why the French Emperor chooses to prolong such an anomalous state of things. First, it may be alleged that the honour of France is engaged not to abandon a government which she has upheld so long. Secondly, Napoleon III. hopes by such support to conciliate towards his throne Roman Catholic sentiment, and to enlist on his side the clergy, who have much influence in France. And, thirdly, by holding his position at Rome, he secures a vantage-ground in Italy which admits of indefinite extension. It is the end of the wedge, which at any moment may be driven home. He gets, however, small thanks for his pains. He has done too much or too little. He has gone too far not to be required by the Pope to go a great deal farther. He has been passive while sacrilegious hands were spoiling the patrimony of the Church, when a word from him would have arrested the invader, lie, like the King of Sardinia, has dared to draw distinctions between the temporal Sovereign of the State and the spiritual Head of the Church, and has appealed to history to prove that, from time to time, ecclesiastical territories have been taken by Catholic Powers from the Holy See, and that, in the negotiations of 1815,




the Romagna and the Legations were treated as belonging to the Allies by right of conquest, and were on the point of being permanently separated from the Pontifical States.*

These things are neither forgiven nor forgotten; and it is only in despair of other help that the Pope sullenly accepts the protection of France, which alone saves the Government of the Vatican from destruction.

But what in the mean time was the state of things at Naples? The King had abandoned his capital, but not his kingdom, and behind the line of the Volturno had turned at bay against the insurgents with an army which could not be reckoned at less than 30, 000 strong. To conquer this would seem, to ordinary minds, the first and indispensable task which Garibaldi had to perform. But it shows the character of the man, and the idea which had taken possession of his soul, that he was ready even then to precipitate a conflict with the French at Koine and the Austrians in Venetia. 'Italians,' he exclaimed in a proclamation, 'the moment is come! Our brothers are already fighting the stranger in the heart of Italy. Let us go and meet them in Koine, and thence march together towards the Venetian land.' We shall not attempt to give anything like a detailed account of the feverish struggle that ensued at Naples—a struggle not of arms, but. of principles, or rather factions—while the Dictator had to divide his energies between the duties of civil government and those of military command. But it must not be forgotten that Garibaldi's political creed had always hitherto been that of the Republicans. His political friends and associates were such men as Mazzini, Saffi, Crispi, and Bertani, and it seems to have been from personal admiration of Victor Emmanuel, 'il Re Galantuomo,' as he is called in Italy, and of his gallant bearing in the field of battle, rather than from any attachment to monarchy, that he did not proclaim a Republic when he first landed in Sicily. But for some time it was doubtful whether Victor Emmanuel or Mazzini would carry the day at Naples. One of the first acts of Garibaldi was to make over the Neapolitan fleet to the Sardinian Admiral Persano, and he headed his decrees 'Italy and Victor Emmanuel.' But he appointed Mordini and Sirtori—both men of extreme opinions—the. one Pro-Dictator of Sicily and the other Pro-Dictator of Naples.

* See the despatch of M. Thouvenel to Count Persigny, February 8, 1860. Further Correspondence on Affaire of Italy.

His Ministry also was of the same complexion, and became, indeed, decidedly Republican when Libertini, de Boni, Conforti, Anguissola, and Rainier! found themselves in power. But the hopes of this party were suddenly disappointed by the appearance of a decree in which Garibaldi declared it indispensable to promulgate 'the fundamental law of the Italian Monarchy] and proclaimed lo Statuto, the Sardinian Charter, which had been granted by Charles Albert to his subjects on the 4th of March, 1848. This seemed as if it were in favour of annexation to Piedmont, but, to prove the contrary, he paid a flying visit to Sicily, and at Palermo, in a public address, thanked the people for their resistance to the scheme, telling them, 'At Rome he will proclaim the kingdom of Italy,' but not then, while there were 'brothers beyond the Volturno with chains on their ankles.' The truth is that, intoxicated with success, he thought that neither the French nor the Austrians would be able to stop his victorious career, but he well knew that, if annexation were proclaimed, his mission was at end. He would no longer be master of the helm, and more cautious pilots would avoid the rocks against which, in his heated imagination, he was ready to dash the ship. Some of the appointments were laughable from their absurdity, such as that of the French novelist M. Dumas, who was made Director of the National Museum, with a special commission to present a project to the Dictator on the excavations of Pompeii. But it was a more serious matter, and one full of significance, when a decree appeared awarding a pension to the family of Agesilao Milano, the Neapolitan soldier who, in 1856, attempted to assassinate Ferdinand II with his bayonet, and was hanged for the crime. By another decree, all the archiepiscopal and episcopal funds were declared national property, but a provision was made for the maintenance of the clergy. For some time the office of Secretary to the Dictator was held by Bertani, a man about whose republican principles there was little doubt, and during the first two or three weeks of Garibaldi's ' reign' it seemed as if the end would be the proclamation of a republic at Naples. He was surrounded by an atmosphere of plots and intrigues, which thickened as time advanced. But his personal devotion to King Victor Emmanuel, and his conviction that without the help of Piedmont it would be impossible to work out the idea of Italian unity, determined him to adhere to his original plan of annexation, while he reserved to himself the right of postponing the period of its accomplishment. Bertani was dismissed from the secretaryship, and Sirtori was succeeded by the Marquis Pallavicini, one of whose first acts was to address a letter to Mazzini, calling upon him to retire from Naples,




on the ground that his presence as the representative of the Republican principle created embarrassment to the Government and dangers to the nation. Mazzini, as might be expected, refused, saying that he was not prepared spontaneously to make another sacrifice, having already made one when, 'interrupting the apostolate of his faith, for the sake of unity and concord, he declared that lie accepted monarchy not out of respect for ministers or monarchs, but for the satisfaction of a blinded majority of. the Italian people.' This led to a ministerial crisis; for Mazzini appealed to Garibaldi, and he stood by his friend. Pallavicini and his colleagues in consequence resigned. But the populace at Naples shouted 'Down with Mazzini!' ' Down with Crispi!' and Pallavicini resumed office. And, besides the party of the Annexationists and the party of the Republicans, there was a third party, that of the 'Unitarians,' so called, not in a theological but in a political sense. Their creed was that Piedmont should become Italian, and not Italy Piedmontese. They objected to the charter and code of Sardinia becoming the charter and the code of the rest of the Peninsula, unless and until in some solemn conclave of the representatives of the nation such was declared to be the will of the whole people. Pallavicini wished to break up this association. The leaders appealed to Garibaldi, and declared that it should continue, being under his special guarantee. And yet the next day he issued an address to the people in which he announced that 'to-morrow Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy, the elect of the nation, will break down the frontier which has hitherto divided as for so many centuries from the rest of our country, ' and he called upon them to receive ' the sent of Providence, ' when there would be no more political colours, no more parties, no more dis cords. At the same time he proclaimed that the Two Sicilies form an integral part of one and indivisible Italy, under her constitutional King, Victor Emmanuel, and his descendants; and that he would, on the arrival of that monarch, depose in his hands the Dictatorship conferred upon him by the nation.

The truth is, that the advent of the King of Sardinia had become a political necessity, unless the revolution was to end in anarchy or a restoration. The Neapolitan royal army still held the line of the Volturno, and occupied the two fortresses of Capua and Gaeta. On the 1st of October Francis II. in person led A general attack against the insurgent forces at Santa Maria and San Angelo, and a battle was fought which lasted the whole day.

Garibaldi was victorious; but the obstinacy of the struggle showed that the royalists were strong and determined; and, if they had been successful, nothing would have prevented the King's entry into his capital. Reactionary symptoms were beginning to show themselves in the provinces; and in Naples itself councils were divided, and chaotic confusion seemed about to become the order of the day. It was clear that Garibaldi could fight, but could not govern; and the only hope of the moderate Liberals was in the intervention of Piedmont. Addresses were hastily got up and despatched to Victor Emmanuel, praying him to take possession of the kingdom of the Two 'Sicilies; and certainty', if ever there was a case in which, if the act was to be done at all, at were well it were done quickly,' it was now. But how could this be? The King of Sardinia was at peace with the King of Naples, and there was no cause or pretext for war. How, then, could Victor Emmanuel invade the dominions of Francis II., and give orders to his army to attack an ally in the agony of conflict with insurrection? We have seen that Lord John Russell solves the difficulty by quoting a passage from Vattel, and saying that the insurrection was just. Count Cavour has added other precedents to the solitary one which Lord John Russell's industry had discovered in Vattel; but he uses them for the purpose of showing, not that the conduct of Sardinia was consistent with international law, as Lord John Russell would have us believe, but, that she sinned in good company, and could plead examples of its violation. In his letter to Count de Launay, the Sardinian Minister at Berlin, dated November 9, in which he vindicates the policy of his Government, he triumphantly asks:—

'Did not France and England, when they lent aid to insurgent Flanders, trample international law underfoot? Was not this said law broken by Louis XIV. when ho assisted the Hungarian insurrection—by the States General when they supported William of Orange against James II. —by Louis XVI., who so nobly contributed to the liberation of the United States of America— by Christian Europe, who delivered Greece from the Ottoman domination?'

Victor Emmanuel, however, cared little for precedents or the opinions of jurists; but he cared much to be King of Italy. Emboldened by the success of his invasion of the Papal States, and relying upon the passive attitude of the Great Powers he avowed himself the leader of the national movement, and assumed the responsibility of its guidance In an address from Ancona to the people of Southern Italy, on the 9th of October, he said:—

'All Italy has feared that, under the shade of a glorious popularity, of a classic probity, there was n faction clustering which was ready to sacrifice the Immediate triumph of the nation to the chimeras of its own ambitious fanaticism. All the Italians have applied to me to avert this danger. It was my duly to do so, because in the existing state of tilings it would not be moderation, it would not be wisdom, but weakness and imprudence, if I did not assume with a flttn hand the direction of the national movement fur which I am responsible before Europe. '

And he added, —' In Europe my policy will not be without its use, by reconciling the progrcssW peoples with the stability of monarchs. ' It certainly did not reconcile the progress of the people of the Two Sicilies with the stability of the throne of the Bourbons; nor if Hungary breaks out into insurrection is it likely to reconcile the progress of the Hungarians with the stability of the Austrian monarchy. If, indeed, it seems that despotic governments are to take warning, and that their best chance of averting revolt is to give their subjects a constitution, we are disposed to a certain extent to agree with the assertion. But bitter experience has proved that constitutions cannot be safely extemporized, and that when this is attempted the result too often is disastrous failure. The rest may be soon told. Immediately after his address from Ancona, King Victor Emmanuel, without any declaration of war, and while the Neapolitan ambassador was still at Turin, gave orders to his army to cross the frontier into the Abrnzzi, and it advanced in the direction of Capua. The leading columns came into collision with the royalist troops on the heights of Macerone, near Isernia, and defeated them, compelling them to retire upon Capua. Garibaldi advanced with a body of volunteers to meet the King, and on the 26th ofOctober their first interview took place, between Teano and Speranzano.

In the mean time the question of annexation to Piedmont had been put to the vote, and the result was an overwhelming majority in its favour. * The King entered Naples on the 7th of November, amidst the clamorous applause of the populacel and immediately visited the cathedral, where St. Januarius did not refuse to recognise the successful monarch, and his blood liquefied in the most orthodox manner. Two days afterwards Garibaldi quitted Naples for his solitary home in the Island of Caprcra, having first issued a pro-

* Tlie numbers we believe were—Yes. 1. 302, 064; No, 10, 312.

clamation in which he called upon the Italians to be ready with a million of men in arms in March, 1861.

Thus, then, the'great drama has been accomplished; and Victor Emmanuel mav be hailed in the words of Banquo:—

' Thou hast it now, King, Cawdor, Glammis, all. '

We will not continue the quotation, for we have no wish to use hard language, although we have felt bound to express our opinion of the conduct of Sardinia in the ambitious game that she has played. If the rules of international law—which are the safeguard of the weak against the strong—are to be set aside, and one State ia to be allowed to act as Sardinia has done, and to determine in what way the government of another is to be carried on, we confess that we cannot see without alarm the consequences to which such a doctrine must lead. It is no answer to say that a government is bad, and therefore ought to be overthrown. The question, as we have already said, is not as to the right of subjects to resist, but the right of a stranger to interfere. But then it is alleged that Sardinia is not a stranger, because she is Italian; and that this gives her a title, which makes the case exceptional. We doubt, however, whether even this principle is large enough to satisfy those who are ready to defend interference in Italy. They take the broader ground of sympathy with oppression, and the duty of freemen to assist those who are struggling to be free, Homo sum, humani nihil d me alienum puto, is their political motto; and this of course transcends all difference of country and distinction of race. With such reasoncrs it is of no use to argue. They may plead the authority of Vattel and Lord John Russell, but they will be denounced by the great majority of thinking men as the plagues and pests of kingdoms; and when their enterprise fails, and they are captured, they will be dealt with, not as prisoners of war, but as pirates and buccaneers. But the doctrine of nationalities is more plausible. The geographical position of Italy, cut off by the sea and the Alps, the boundaries of nature, from the rest of Europe, is apt to suggest the idea that its different territories were rather the provinces of one kingdom than independent states. History declares the contrary; and an attentive examination of the strongly marked natural boundaries between many of the Italian States will tend to explain their history. Unless we are prepared to ignore the past, and construct a theory about Italy instead of accepting facts, we must admit that Italian unity is a thing which, except perhaps under the pressure of Roman domination, the world has hitherto never seen. If so, and if nationality is to be pressed as the argument to justify Sardinia, we ask where it is to stop? The Ionian Islands very possibly, if left to themselves, would declare for 'annexation' to Greece. Is England, however, prepared to surrender them? Is she prepared to give up Gibraltar to Spain, and Malta to Italy? Nay, foreign nations may ask with what consistency she holds India in fee—that mighty Peninsula of the East, with the Himalayas for its Alps, and the Indian Ocean for its Mediterranean and Adriatic?

But whatever difference of opinion there may be as to the mode in which the new kingdom of Italy lias been formed, there can be amongst ourselves but one wish and hope for its success. Constitutional government in place of tyranny, temperate liberty in place of coercion, and freedom of conscience in place of bigotry and intolerance, are blessings which it must be the ardent desire of Englishmen to see extended amongst the nations of Europe, and the best minds of Italy have long yearned for the enjoyment of them. England has no interest in the maintenance of despotism, and she never was a party to any Holy Alliance against the liberties of peoples. If it 19 found possible to form into one strong whole the petty states into which Italy has been divided, and to work out satisfactorily the problem of giving representative institutions to the people without making the national parliament the arena of faction and intrigue, and endangering the monarchy, we shall unteignedly rejoice in the result. Within her own limiix, hitherto, Sardinia has done well. From the time when, in 1848, Charles Albert gave his subjects a constitution, and proclaimed lo Statute as the charter of their liberties, the Government has steadily pursued the path of progress and improvement We watched with interest the struggle between the King and the Pope—so strangely like that which seven centuries ago was fought in this country between Henry II. and Becket, and which Canon Robertson has lately described with admirable impartiality* —and we applauded the courage with which the pretensions of the clergy were resisted and they were forced to yield to the supremacy of the law. It was indeed a task of no ordinary difficulty to break through the slavish traditions of the past, and, in spite of the thunders of Rome, to establish independence of the Vatican without ceasing to belong to the great Catholic communion. The domestic policy of Count Cavour has been chiefly modelled on the example of

* ' Becket: a Biography. ' London, 1859.

England, where he long resided, and not only studied but wrote upon questions that interest ourselves. * From England he learnt the doctrines of free-trade, which have been applied in Piedmont to a considerable extent; and even in the conduct of business in the Sardinian Chamber, when he wants a pro cedent or an authority, he takes care to fortify himself with the example of the British Parliament. It is impossible to travel in Piedmont without being struck by the signs of material wealth and happiness which are seen in the execution of public works, the active industry of the population, their contented aspect, and the manly yet respectful independence of their manner. There are, however, many drawbacks, not the least of which are a bigoted priest-party, and an impetuous democratic faction; and the success of the government cannot be considered perfectly secure. Nevertheless it aims at being a good Government, and we think that to some other parts of Italy, if not to the whole, the extension of such a Government would be great gain. Indeed we have heard that a change for the better has already taken place in the Legations, and in other parts of Central Italy annexed to Piedmont; that railways are in course of construction, commerce is springing up, and life and activity taking the place of apathy and misery.

We must not, however, shut our eyes to the fact that there are immense difficulties in the way, and that many disturbing forces will be at work to mar the success of the experiment. \Vith the exception of England, the Great Powers of Europe will look coldly on the new Italian kingdom. But, independently of danger from without, the internal organization of the new territories will be no easy task. The first difficulty will be Naples, that kingdom which Victor Emmanuel has so prematurely grasped. Assuming that he is permitted to obtain full possession of the country, it will be necessary to enforce at Naples and throughout Calabria, with stern severity, obedience to the law. In this process, according to the latest accounts, not even a beginning has been made. For some time Victor Emmanuel's possession of the Two Sicilies will be little different from a military occupation; for, to say nothing of the work to be done at Gae4B[ a large force, which Sardinia can very ill spare, must be spread over the country, whether in the shape of the regular army or the mobilised battalions of the National Guards of Turin, Milan, Brescia, Genoa, and Florence—to preserve order and

* He wrote, for instance, an essay, Sur FEtal actuel d: FMantle et ton Avenir.

put down ' reactionary' attempts. The pressure of the tax-gatherer will be also felt, and men will find out that the blessings of a constitutional government are not to be enjoyed without paying for them. It is doubtful whether the masses were desirous of the changes which have taken place. We observe that Mr. Pctre, in his despatch, * says that the Neapolitan population at large was tranquil, or, at least, apathetic, even when everything like free speech or thought was instantly put down. But besides all this, when the momentary and by no means universal feeling in favour of Victor Emmanuel has passed away, there will arise a jealous suspicion that Naples is treated as an appanage of Sardinia, and-does not obtain her fair share in the administration of the government. The inhabitants of Calabria are very different from the inhabitants of Tuscany and Piedmont. They are a mixed race, consisting of descendants from Greeks, Normans, Germans, French, and Spaniards, besides the original settlers, and, long accustomed to the rule of a corrupt and despotic government, are little fitted to exercise the rights of freemen or give fair play to the action of representative institutions. They will require for many years firm and energetic control, and it is not difficult to see that many elements of discontent will be rife amongst them. The soldiers of the disbanded regiments of the Royalist army have also been turned adrift in the country, and will cause no little trouble, both as brigands and conspirators. Nor can it be without a sigh that the Neapolitans will see their unrivalled city sink from the dignity of the capital of a kingdom to the position of a provincial town. 'Moreover, Sicily has always shown the utmost jealousy of being incorporated with Naples, and has in former years struggled for independence. It remains to be seen how far the island will be content to surrender this idea, and to become a mere province of the Italian kingdom. We mention these things not because we have any sympathy with the Government which has fallen, but because they arc difficulties which it is foolish to ignore. Our anxious hope is, that they may be overcome, and that the more than questionable policy of Victor Emmanuel in the mode in which he has hastened to add so largely to his dominions may not prove hereafter a source of weakncssBhd danger to himself.

But there are other more immediate perils to be met. The King of Italy has to face the questions of Venetia and Rome. When Garibaldi quitted Naples in November and retired to his Patmoa at Caprera, he left as a

* 'A Century of Despotism, ' p. 220.

legacy to the new Government the battle-crv of ' a million of men and muskets in March. ' The creed of the great mass of the Italians is, that without Rome and Venice there is no Italy, and that to abandon them to their present fate is to be guilty of the worst treason to the cause of nationality. It is clear that no considerations except those of prudence would deter Count Cavour from attacking Venetia; but he knows that if Sardinia is the first assailant of Austria, she need expect no assistance from France; and he is too sagacious a politician not to foresee the tremendous risks that would be run in a singlehanded contest with a great military Power. Prudence, however, and foresight arc not qualities which find favour with the multitude in respect of questions which arc embraced by it with the fervour of sentiment and passion; nor is it likely that the youth of Italy will listen to such counsels when what they believe to be the fated moment has arrived anil Garibaldi calls them to arms. How, then, will the Government be able to restrain them after the example it has set and the encouragement it has given? The Mazzinian party is actively at work, and it will not be difficult to persuade a fickle and indolent people that they have gained lit^e^by revolution but a change of masters, and that the best use they can make of successful insurrection is to establish a republic. But, above all, there is a very great likelihood that Garibaldi himself, if he thinks the King backward in the cause of Italian unity, will join with Mazzini and set up a republic at Naples, when the lamentable tragedy of 1848 is sure to be repeated.

Count Cavonr seems to hope for a peaceful solution of the difficulty as regards Venetia from the force and pressure of public opinion. In the speech he delivered in the Chamber of Deputies at Turin, in October, when the projet de lot was to authorise the King to accept the annexation of those provinces of Central and Southern Italy in which the population, by universal suffrage, manifested a wish to form part of the constitutional monarchy of Sardinia, he said:—

' We are asked, how then will you solve ibe Venetian question? In a very simple nmnner, by changing the opinion of Europe. But how? The opinion of Europe will change, because the opposition wo now meet exists not only in the Governments, but, we must avow it, nUo in a jireat port of the population, even liberal, of Europe. '

Opinion alone, in the sense in which Count Cavour uses the word, will not be sufficient. Nor is it reasonable to suppose that a voluntary surrender will be made without an equivalent; and which amongst the nations in

Europe is entitled to ask Austria to make the sacrifice? They have no right to call upon her to give up Venctia, which she holds by the title of treaty and the possession of more than sixty years; but, if she chooses, she may sell it; and this is the scheme which finds favour with many who have no wish to hurt her pride or cripple her power. They say that the province imparts no real strength to her empire under the conditions by which alone it can in future be held, and that it is, in fact, a drain upon her resources and a chronic ulcer in her side. What Austria wants in her present impoverished condition, is money, and here she has an admirable opportunity of filling her exhausted coffers. They say that to reconcile the inhabitants of Venice to the yoke of Austria, after the events of the past year, is a moral impossibility, and that nothing but the presence of an enormous military force can prevent disaffection from bursting into revolt. The time seems to have gone by when any amount of concession or reform would be of the least avail; and so long as Venetia is politically separated from the rest of Italy, it will be a constant source of expense, trouble, and danger to the empire. Certainly, if this be so, no civilized government can desire to hold part of its dominions on such a tenure. On the other hand, it is urged that the possession of Venetia is necessary for the defence of Austria as a German Power, and that the Quadrilateral is that which protects her southern frontier from invasion. To this it might perhaps be replied, that on the south she will always have the mighty barrier of the Rhjetian Alps, and that it is as easy to prevent them from being turned by constructing a line of fortresses on the north-east of Venice as it is by the existence of the Quadrilateral on the west. That Austria should be strong, and should present a firm and massive bulwark against Russia on one side and against France on the other, is very important for the peace and safety of Europe, and, naturally, is not much desired by France, who would be glad to see the dissolution of the only Continental Power which can at present oppose any effectual barrier to her encroachments. The value of Austria is great, however moderate her merit may be. She has lately evinced a desire to conciliate the provinces north of the Alps which own her sway, and we hope that she may yet succeed in retrieving the affections of Hungary, which her enemies are striving to rend from her, and in giving new life and spirit to her German States. But her position is at this moment highly precarious. We turn now to Rome. In the same speech which we have last quoted of Count Oavour's, he carried with him the rapturous applause of the Chamber when he said—

' During the last twelve years the polestar of King Victor Emmanuel has been the principle of national independence. What will this star be with respect to Rome? Our star, gentlemen, will direct us to look upon the Eternal City, upon which flve-and-twcnty centuries have accumulated nil glorious memories, as destined to become the splendid capital of our Italian kingdom. '

Very possibly Rome, notwithstanding many disadvantages, may be deemed (as Turin is not) a desirable capital to complete the decorations of the new Italian kingdom; although it may be doubted whether any capital, in the ordinary sense, is desirable at present for a combination of States hitherto very jealous of each other, and each of them accustomed to regard its own capital as the centre of all that is "desirable in life. It has been suggested that Bologna, which is a central position, might be adopted as a sort of Italian Washington for the meeting of the Parliament. But if Rome is indispensable, what is to become of the Pope and his Government? We have seen that the view of the French Emperor was, and perhaps still is, that there should be an offer Romanus consecrated to his dominion, within which he should preserve the rights of a temporal prince. But we know that the patrimony of St. Peter will submit to the Pope and the College of Cardinals only so long as it is garrisoned by France. If the French troops were withdrawn, the population of Rome would rise en masse and proclaim their union with the rest of Italy. Victor Emmanuel would neither wish nor dare to say to the Romans that they alone of the Italians shall remain subject to a government which they detest, and, in the new state of things that has arisen, we hold it to be impossible for Piedmont to guarantee any kind of temporal sovereignty to the Pope. The French Emperor, again, has no imaginable right to mark out the limits within which the struggle for a national existence is there to be confined. He has assumed the part of patron and protector of the Pope—and, availing himself of this character, he acts in Italy as if France were an Italian Power. He says to the advancing wave of constitutional monarchy, ' Hitherto shalt thou come, but no farther;' and nothing can be more irritating and humiliating to a people than the way in which the inhabitants of the Roman territory are coerced into oft%dience by the presence of the French.

In some places, where Piedmontese troops have marched into a town, and been hailed with enthusiastic joy by the inhabitants as their deliverers, they have been obliged to retire to avoid a collision with the advancing French, who have extended their occupation as far as Terracina on the south. Indeed, there is no definite limit to which that occupation is now confined, and at any moment French soldiers may be poured into Umbria, or the Marches, for the purpose of restoring them to the Pope, with as good reason as the territory around Rome is now held by them in subjection to him. But it is not only the Tope who is patronised by the Emperor. The king of Naples confesses his obligations to him. While professing absolute neutrality in the struggle in Southern Italy, Napoleon III. continues to make his presence there felt, and his wishes obeyed. French men-of-war ride at anchor in the harbour of Gaeta, and the Sardinian fleet is not permitted to bombard or even to blockade the fortress by sea, which a Sardinian army has invested, and is attacking by land. We are not therefore surprised at the gratitude expressed by M. Casella, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Gae'ta, in a note addressed by him on the 12th of November to the Neapolitan Ambassadors at foreign Courts. While Russia, Austria, and England stand aloof, France under a Napoleon shows sympathy and friendship to a dynasty of Bourbons! Well might M. Casella tender him thanks for so reasonable an intervention, which stayed the downfall of the monarchy, and gave Francis II. one chance more in the chapter of accidents.

'The Emperor of the French, ' he said, 'alone (and it is for us a duty of justice and gratitude to openly acknowledge it) set the generous example of a disposition to put an end to this state of universal apathy. Loyal and monarchical England ventured to reproach him bitterly for it, while the other Cabinets merely allowed him to bear tlie whole risk of the magnanimous enterprise he contemplated. The sending of the French squadron into the waters of Gae'ta, and the fraternal reception given by the soldiers of France to the faithful and valiant remnant of the Royal troops on the Pontifical territory, are facts which will ever remain graven on the heart of the King onr Sovereign, and far exceed the protestations of friendship offered to His Majesty by the rest of Europe. '

The truth is, that France has never really favoured, and never can favour, the rise of a great and independent Italian kingdom, which should assume its due place in the councils of Europe, and be a formidable rival to France itself, in those waters which she would fain call her own. ^France has always striven with Spain and Austria for influence and dominion in Italy: she hoped to play this game again in appropriating Tuscany; and being disappointed in that quarter, she seems to be prolonging the agony of Southern Italy with a view to throw things into confusion and to prevent the new King from consolidating his power. Thereby, peradvcn-

ture, Naples may, in some way, pass into her hands, or come under a French ruler. She never wants a plausible pretext for interference. At Rome the excuse is the protection of the Pope; in Syria, the protection of the Christians. 13ut in reality nobody imagines that the motive of French intervention in Italy is to uphold the temporal Government of the Holy See, or that the object of pouring troops into Syria is to protect the Maronites and punish the Druses. Syria lies too close to Turkey and to Egypt not to explain the readiness with which France seizes the opportunity of planting her foot there, and the pertinacity with which she augments her army of occupation. How long will it Le before we hear of the revival of the plan of 1841, for placing Syria under the Pasha of Egypt or some other nominee of France I What means the persistence with which she clings to that which, in any other than a political aspect, must be confessed to be an enormous blunder, the project of the Suez Canal? Is it in the interest of peaceful commerce, or with a view to keep a force there under the guise of engineers and workmen, to be employed when the opportunity arises for the occupation of Egypt? Again, why should France, which has little or no commerce in the Red Sea, or beyond it, be taking up a position within the Straits of Babelmandcb? Algeria itself is a vast military establishment, scarcely to be called a colony; costly and burdensome to the nation, but a nursery of soldiers—a means of extending French influence to Tunis and Morocco, and not likely to be relinquished while a dream exists of the possibility of converting the Mediterranean into a French lake. Spain, known to be so deeply influenced by France, has recently been suspected of designs on the Straits, wholly inconsistent with her promise to England, made at the commencement of the late war with Morocco. Already twice since the cession of Savoy and the occupation of the neutralised districts of Chablais and Faucigny, France has had quarrels with Switzerland tor real or imaginary affronts to her flag; and we know what uneasiness is felt throughout the Confederation at the proximity of so ambitions and restless a neighbour. Well might tlie Emperor say to Count Persigny, in his letter of the 2, 'Jth of July, that 'affairs appeared to him to be complicated, thanks to the mistrust excited everywhere since the war in Italy;' and it was not without reason that he volunteered to attempt an apology for his policy with the view of removing that mistrust. \Ve are struck with the applicability of a description given of France by a traveller two centuries ago to France of the present day. lie says, ' It is manifest the chief designs of the King of France are by a constant war, not only to keep the unquiet spirit of his own people in action abroad, and, by being still armed, to a╗e the commonalty and draw what treasures lie pleases from them, but to make conquests upon the House of Austria Hs time and accidents afford best opportunities; but it is conceived his principal aim is at Flanders and sonic parts of Germany. '*

No doubt the Emperor of the French is our ally, and has lately given tokens of his friendship, not only in committing his fair Empress to our gallantry, but in abolishing that passport system which is so detested in England and so injurious to French interests. No doubt also he is willing to be on good terms with his own people, for he has initiated institutions by which, if really carried into effect, he and they may at least hear each other's voices, and have some chance of understanding each other. But, nevertheless, the mistrust which he complains of has not died away. We hear of renewed warlike preparations in France—more extensive, it is said, than in 1859—of a most formidable revolutionary combination in Hungary—of Sardinian ships laden with munitions of war for the Magyars stopped at the mouth of the Danube, but not until supplies of arms and artillery had been introduced into the countries lying on the banks of that river.

But to return to the Kingdom of Italy: will this great name become a reality, and 'Insperata floruit" be written in its history, or will the dismal saying bo verified, that 'the dry wood will not sprout?' What are the forces that have caused its rise? Has France made it, and can France undo it, or is there, at length, after so tame and so protracted a submission to foreign masters, a revival of the ancient hardihood that made Rome the mistress of Italy and of the world? We know that Piedmont is being drained of men, but we do not hear of any great levies in other parts of Italy. And if the men of Italy have the right qualities, is there any common ground upon which they can meet, and, with all the wisdom and resolution of which they are capable, take counsel together for'the whole of Italy? Will that which never existed as a really homogeneous and consentient nation become so now? Piedmont, we fear, will look down upon Naples, and Naples consider the Piedmontese as foreign invaders: indeed, the Government of Naples (even if France should cease to intervene at Gaeta) will be the great difficulty. Lombardy, ngain, will grudge the heavy taxes of Piedmont, and Tuscany may

* Sir Thomas I'anmer'a 'Account of France in 1648. '

I be disposed to look back upon the quiet days of the Grand Dukes. If all these states can be permanently connected as one nation, in that nation will many elements of greatness be combined. It will have the tine genius of the Italians, endless physical advantages of climate, soil, and situation, and the ennobling memory of great deeds. But the process of amalgamation, to be successful, must be conducted in a cautions and conservative spirit; not by insisting upon centralisation and uniformity in all things—which is j opposed to the spirit and habits of the Italian people, and hostile to true liberty everywhere—but by maintaining and extending the admirable municipal institutions which most of the Italian States already possess, and of which they are justly proud, and by i taking care that the hand of the Government j shall not be too much felt in details. Everything that is done by a government for a; people which the people are ready and willing to do for themselves, hurts their self-love, injures their capacity for exertion, and tends, to alienate them from the ruling power. I There are certain functions which Piedmont | can best perform for Italy. The army and the diplomacy and the national policy of Italy must be governed and conducted by the central authority, but all the domestic institutions of the different States need not be mechanically remodelled after the fashion of Piedmont. The more haste that is made to effect a fusion, the less chance there is of a firm and lasting combination. Such a combination of the different Italian States, if not wholly impossible, can only be accomplished very gradually, and by the most patient and skilful statesmanship. For the happiness of the human race wo wish that such statesmanship may be found. Our hopes would be stronger than they arc, if recent events would permit us to attribute to the new rulers of Italy that high sense 6f honour and of public morality, which affords a better qualification for command than, the most consummate adroitness in council or courage in the field. Assuredly our hopes will become faint indeed, if the new nation, instead of entering the circle of the European Powers in peace and goodwill, shall employ itself in extending agitation and conspiracy, and strive, in subservience to the ambition of France, to effect its own immediate object by kindling a general war, from which, whoever may be her new masters, Italy will certainly not emerge independent. We earnestly trust that those te whom the safety of England is committed will henceforth carefully avoid compromising the name and credit of this country, as Lord John Russell has done, by giving a sanction to enterprises with which we have no concern, and the ultimate results of which it is impossible to foresee; ami that our course will be one of even and impartial amity towards all who desire our friendship, but of firm and vigilant defensive preparation against those who may seek to injure us, either by direct attack or by breaking up the great European system, which, while it was respected, secured so many years of peace and prosperity to all.

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